Pour comparer des ensembles de stratégies il existe un grand nombre de méthodes. Parmi celles-ci les modèles évolutionnaires offrent une pertinence et une robustesse remarquable. Nous étudions dans cet article deux modèles évolutionnaires parmi les plus simples et naturels possibles au dilemme itéré du prisonnier : le modèle individualiste dans lequel un individu se confronte à tout le monde et le modèle communautaire dans lequel un individu ne se confronte pas aux membres de sa propre famille. À l’aide de simulations massives utilisant des classes complètes de stratégies nous mettons en évidence des évolutions typiques. Pour le modèle individualiste, nous observons avec une grande fréquence une convergence vers un état de coopération généralisée. Pour le modèle communautaire, dont nous défendons la pertinence, nous montrons qu’il se produit de manière quasi-systématique un phénomène de convergence vers un attracteur unique et indépendant de la distribution initiale des effectifs. Des résultats statistiques sur la fréquence de ces attracteurs sont calculés et analysés.
To compare sets of strategies, there are a large number of different methods. Among these, evolutionary models offer a relevance and remarkable robustness. We study in this article two of the simplest and most advanced evolutionary models: the individualistic model in which an individual meets himself with everyone else and the community model in which an individual does not meet members of his own family. With the help of simulations using complete classes of strategies, we highlight two typical evolutions. For the individualistic model, we observe with great frequency a convergence towards a state of widespread cooperation. For the community model, for which we defend relevance, we highlight a convergence phenomenon towards a unique attractor and independent of the initial distribution of population. Statistical results on the frequency of these attractors are calculated and analyzed.
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Keywords: Game Theory, Iterated prisoner’s Dilemma, Agent’s Strategy, Behaviour.
CC-BY 4.0
@article{ROIA_2023__4_2_67_0,
author = {Jean-Paul Delahaye and Philippe Mathieu},
title = {\^Etre ou ne pas \^etre individualiste, quelles cons\'equences~?},
journal = {Revue Ouverte d'Intelligence Artificielle},
pages = {67--95},
publisher = {Association pour la diffusion de la recherche francophone en intelligence artificielle},
volume = {4},
number = {2},
year = {2023},
doi = {10.5802/roia.57},
language = {fr},
url = {https://roia.centre-mersenne.org/articles/10.5802/roia.57/}
}
TY - JOUR AU - Jean-Paul Delahaye AU - Philippe Mathieu TI - Être ou ne pas être individualiste, quelles conséquences ? JO - Revue Ouverte d'Intelligence Artificielle PY - 2023 SP - 67 EP - 95 VL - 4 IS - 2 PB - Association pour la diffusion de la recherche francophone en intelligence artificielle UR - https://roia.centre-mersenne.org/articles/10.5802/roia.57/ DO - 10.5802/roia.57 LA - fr ID - ROIA_2023__4_2_67_0 ER -
%0 Journal Article %A Jean-Paul Delahaye %A Philippe Mathieu %T Être ou ne pas être individualiste, quelles conséquences ? %J Revue Ouverte d'Intelligence Artificielle %D 2023 %P 67-95 %V 4 %N 2 %I Association pour la diffusion de la recherche francophone en intelligence artificielle %U https://roia.centre-mersenne.org/articles/10.5802/roia.57/ %R 10.5802/roia.57 %G fr %F ROIA_2023__4_2_67_0
Jean-Paul Delahaye; Philippe Mathieu. Être ou ne pas être individualiste, quelles conséquences ?. Revue Ouverte d'Intelligence Artificielle, Volume 4 (2023) no. 2, pp. 67-95. doi : 10.5802/roia.57. https://roia.centre-mersenne.org/articles/10.5802/roia.57/
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